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Introduction
Interest in agrarian institutions has been rising over these past decades, as an academic ﬁeld of research as well as a public policy concern in developing countries (Bard-
han 1989, Hayami and Otsuka 1993, de Janvry et al. 2001, 
Deininger and Feder 2001, World Bank 2003). Along this trend, 
agrarian contracts, and sharecropping more speciﬁcally, come 
out as a major focus of interest. Beyond their diversity, con-
temporary economic models of agrarian contracts share some 
common features (for recent reviews, see Otsuka, Chuma, and 
Hayami, 1992, and Dasgupta, Knight, and Love 1999):
a)  While retaining the postulate of maximizing agents, these 
models go beyond the orthodox neoclassical approach, 
as they apprehend the economic rationale of contractual 
practices in the light of market imperfections, asymmetric 
information, or actors’ attitude towards risk. The rationale 
of contractual arrangements is seen as grounded in the 
comparative efﬁciency of resource allocation under the 
different arrangements (share versus ﬁxed-lease versus 
labor contracts). 
Some Rationales for Sharecropping:
Empirical Evidence from Mexico
Jean-Philippe Colin
These past decades, agrarian contracts such as sharecropping have re-emerged as a major focus of interest. Economists typically 
conceptualize these contracts as an agency relationship (in the economic sense) between large and labor-constrained landlords 
and landless tenants. From a methodological perspective, while acknowledging the theoretical insights of economists, this 
article, based on comparative case studies carried out in Mexico, suggests that understanding contractual practices depends on 
a comprehensive and theoretically-grounded ethnographic approach. Explaining contractual practices, actors’ decision criteria 
are investigated rather than postulated or econometrically inferred. A detailed comparative case-study approach highlights 
the local diversity in contractual practices and contractual conﬁgurations. From a theoretical perspective, the paper suggests 
drawing upon different theoretical insights, as a single theoretical model cannot exhaust empirical diversity. The share contract 
emerges as a ‘polyfunctional’ institutional arrangement, with a large palette of possible raison d’être.
Key words: sharecropping, agrarian contract, land tenancy, Mexico
Jean-Philippe Colin, socio-economist, is director of research with the 
Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), associated with the 
UMR MOÏSA. This study was realized under a collaborative research 
program between IRD and the Colegio de Postgraduados en Ciencias 
Agrícolas (Mexico). Special thanks to Emmanuelle Bouquet, Michael 
Carter, Robert Hunt, Hermilio Navarro, and three anonymous reviewers 
for helpful comments. The views expressed here remain the author’s sole 
responsibility. UMR MOÏSA, 2 Place Viala, 34060 Montpellier Cedex 
2, France. colin@ensam.inra.fr.
b)  Agrarian contracts are conceptualized as pure contractual 
arrangements, i.e., as systems of rights and duties negoti-
ated by the actors who deﬁne, on the basis of a calculative 
rationality, the rules that will organize their interaction. 
Contractual relationships are therefore understood as rules 
of the games which are freely debated and determined by 
economic agents. 
c)  The paradigmatic approach of tenancy contracts is 
developed through bi-dimensional land/labor models, 
conceptualizing relationships between large and labor-
constrained landlords leasing out land to landless tenants, 
in the context of a manual and/or draft animal labor-based 
farming system. The tenant-landowner relationship is con-
ceptualized as an agency relation, in the economic sense 
of the expression: the contract is established between a 
‘principal’ and an ‘agent’ who provides the principal with 
some services, through a system of remuneration designed 
by the principal in such a way that the agent has incentive 
to behave in the principal’s interest. The agent is supposed 
to maximize his utility function through the determina-
tion of his effort. The principal maximizes his utility by 
manipulating the terms of the contract, his only constraint 
being to provide the agent with his reservation utility (i.e., 
the level of utility he could gain in an alternative activity, 
if he does not accept the contract). 
   Under this general framework, two broad approaches 
can be distinguished. The usual ‘standard’ agency ap-
proach of sharecropping, grounded in a substantive 
conception of rationality, conceptualizes this institutional 
arrangement as an implicit labor relationship, whose 
rationale comes from a trade-off between the tenant’s 
incentive and his aversion to risk (a ﬁxed rent corresponds 
to the higher labor incentive as the tenant keeps all his 
marginal product, but does not permit risk sharing; a 
labor contract transfers all the risk to the landowner, but 
does not provide incentives to the laborer) (Stiglitz 1974). 
The other broad approach corresponds to transaction cost 
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models of sharecropping, which do not emphasize risk 
and consider the role of different sources of transaction 
costs. The type of transaction costs taken into account 
in these models nevertheless remain induced by moral 
hazard problems (transaction costs coming from non-
opportunistic behavior—such as search or negotiation 
costs—are rarely considered). Opportunistic behavior is 
not limited to the tenant’s work effort but it can include 
as well soil over-exploitation, cheating with regard to the 
sharing of the product, in the case of share contracts, etc. 
It can also originate on the side of the landowner, when 
he contributes to the production process by providing 
capital, or technical or marketing expertise. The choice 
between contract types is then explained by the relative 
weight of these agency risks, depending on the contracts 
and the situations (types of crops, of soils, of marketing 
systems, etc.), with sharecropping arising as the result of 
a trade-off between these risks. The transaction cost ap-
proach does not postulate actors’ substantive rationality 
and refers to bounded rationality. However, it mobilizes 
it to explain the incompleteness of the contracts (seen as 
opening the way to opportunistic behavior) rather than 
restrictions on the actors’ calculation ability or the fact 
that economic behavior might be guided by cognitive 
processes (categorization, conceptual framework for en-
coding and interpreting the information) (North 1990:37, 
Lindenberg 1998:720). 
d)  Contemporary economic research on agrarian contracts 
combines a relative theoretical heterodoxy (especially 
acknowledging market imperfections and asymmetric 
information) with the orthodox disciplinary methodology : 
(i) the objective is to produce general and decontextualized 
theories (‘the’ theory of sharecropping…); (ii) the research 
is grounded in a hypothetico-deductive, ex ante, and in 
abstracto modelization; (iii) the search for the rationale 
of contractual practices is based on behavioral models 
which are postulated; (iv) ‘empirical research’ refers to 
the econometrical test of theoretical models through data 
sets already available in data bases, or through large-scale 
standard questionnaire surveys, with a delegation of data 
collection to enumerators and without a strong anchorage 
of the researcher in the empirical situations. 
While acknowledging the theoretical insights produced 
by the economic literature on agrarian contracts, the objective 
of this paper is to suggest that to better understand contrac-
tual practices, ﬁrst, a comprehensive (in a Weberian sense) 
and theoretically-grounded ethnographic approach offers a 
productive perspective by introducing, in the explanation of 
contractual practices, actors’ decision criteria as investigated 
and not as postulated or econometrically inferred. In other 
words, explaining contractual choices in the actors’ perspec-
tive, including how they perceived their situation and their 
available options, should provide interesting insights. This 
research orientation does not question the conceptualization 
of the actors as rational decision-makers, as long as ‘rational 
choice’ does not refer to actors maximizing on the basis of 
accurate cognitive models, but rather to the fact that, when 
facing different options, actors tend to choose the one likely to 
have (in their perception) the best outcome. Second, in terms 
of theoretical framework, one gains in mobilizing different 
theoretical insights, as a single theoretical model cannot exhaust 
empirical diversity. Third, a detailed comparative case-study 
approach highlights the local diversity in contractual practices 
that tends—by nature—to disappear from theoretical models 
or econometric research1. 
The empirical ﬁndings come from a set of studies con-
ducted in Mexico between 1990 and 19982. The four research 
sites were located in the Sierra Madre Oriental (6 villages 
located in Veracruz and Puebla States, ﬁeldwork in 1990-92), 
Oaxaca (community of San Lucas Quiavini, ﬁeldwork in 
1993), Tlaxcala (ejido La Soledad, ﬁeldwork in 1993-94 and 
1997-98), and Tamaulipas (ejidos Miguel Hidalgo and Felipe 
Angeles, in Graciano Sánchez, ﬁeldwork in 1995-96)3. The 
data were collected through long stays in the villages (several 
months in each locality) and combined formal questionnaires 
with informal day-to-day interaction with villagers. This type 
of immersive and intensive-micro research methodology was 
seen as essential for two reasons. (i) Actors’ practices and 
rationales could not be captured any other way. One must 
explore concrete speciﬁc situations and practices, in all their 
diversity and complexity, without reducing beforehand the 
range of potential explanatory variables. (ii) Such a research 
method seems inescapable in order to collect reliable data, 
even if it is at the cost of a weaker coverage of quantitative 
variables. The land issue in Mexico remains a politically 
and socially delicate one. Simply arriving in the villages and 
administering a one-shot questionnaire survey would have 
produced results (villagers are usually friendly and do not 
want to disappoint the researcher)—but quite unreliable ones 
(villagers are usually quite suspicious too). Although these 
research orientations exclude any statistical representative-
ness, they provide meaningful insights regarding the rationale 
of contractual practices. On their ground, one cannot venture 
to generalize but generalizations can be challenged.
This article proceeds, ﬁrst, by presenting the research set-
ting. It then describes the different contractual conﬁgurations 
that could be brought to the fore, as well as the diversity in the 
types of contracts. The last section discusses the diversity of the 
functions of these contracts, in the perspective of the actors.
Research setting
Without pretending to exhaust or represent the extraor-
dinary diversity of the Mexican campo, the research aimed 
at offering insights on the form and role of tenancy in four 
different agro-ecological and socio-economical contexts.4
a)  San Lucas Quiavini is a Zapotec community located in 
the Tlacolula Valley, in the state of Oaxaca. The com-
munity, which existed before the arrival of the Spaniards 
in Mexico, has always been able to control its land, in 
colonial times as well as between the Independence and 
the Revolution. Following the agrarian reform, some vil-
lagers received an ejido in the plain5, but the dominant 
land tenure remains an individual appropriation of arable 
land under a communal status6. Land endowments are 
limited, with an average of 3.5 ha, and a maximum of 13 
ha. The agricultural production is based on the milpa, a 
mixed cropping system of prehispanic origins composed 
of corn (the main component of the association), beans 
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and squash, which covers 90 percent of the cultivated 
area in the village. The milpa is cultivated with local 
varieties, most often without any chemical fertilization, 
and a little manure when the farmer owns some animals. 
Plowing is sometimes done with a tractor, but all other 
cultivation operations are carried out with manual labor 
or an ox team. Soils are thin, of low potential, and the 
rainfall constraint is strong in the context of a rainfall 
agricultural production (only 3 percent of the acreage 
owned by the interviewed farmers was irrigated). The 
yields are variable and low (300 kg/ha of corn on average 
in 1992, exceeding only exceptionally 800 kg/ha). Such 
marginal agro-ecological conditions obviously reduce 
the incentive to create a structural surplus for the market. 
Milpa production is therefore oriented towards human as 
well as animal (corn stalks and leaves—zacate) on-farm 
consumption. Monetary production costs are ﬁnanced 
through off-farm activities, including remittances from 
migration to the United States. A medias contract (one 
half) among comuneros is the share contract used in the 
village. Sharecropping in or out is most often combined 
with direct cultivation. 
b)  The region located in the Sierra Madre Oriental, between 
the Cofre de Perote and the Pico de Orizaba volcanos 
(Veracruz and Puebla states), has been for decades a major 
location of traditional color-varieties potato production. 
As potatoes covered 70 percent of the land area cultivated 
in 1990, the research focused on this speciﬁc crop. Even 
in these ‘traditional’ conditions, the production requires 
an intensive use of inputs: potato seeds (2 tons/ha), labor 
(particularly for planting and harvesting), and the sys-
tematic use of fertilizers and agrochemicals (Table 1).  
 The ﬁnancial constraint is sharpened by very strong 
credit constraints. Furthermore the producers face potato 
market instability, with intra-annual as well as inter-annual 
price ﬂuctuations. The production intensity does constitute 
a constraint, but less intense than one might think, because 
(i) the basic skills required by this traditional production 
belong to the realm of common knowledge; this ‘rustic’ 
production does not require optimal techniques, and the 
quality requirements of the market are lower than those 
regarding improved white varieties; (ii) monetary costs 
up to the harvest can be reduced approximately by half 
by using part of the previous harvest as seeds, by us-
ing family labor and by owning the animals (due to the 
slopes, the producers use ox teams rather than tractors); 
(iii) the cultivated acreage can be adjusted to the available 
resources (a quarter or half-hectare plot is common)—in 
other words, all costs can be considered as variable. Land 
endowments do not reveal a strongly skewed distribution: 
average landholding is 7.6 ha, with a mode between 4 and 
5 ha and a maximum of 65 ha. These land endowments do 
not seem negligible for a crop such as potato, but they can 
become a constraint if the farmer wants to practice fallow 
or crop rotations in order to avoid or deal with nematode 
infestation. Of the acreage owned by the sampled farm-
ers, 48 percent is under the ejido status and 52 percent 
individually appropriated under the communal status or 
privately owned; the land status however has no impact 
on tenancy practices. Tenancy contracting rely mainly on 
share arrangements, especially a medias contracts under 
a wide diversity of contractual terms. 
c)  The ejido La Soledad (Tlaxcala State) was founded in 
1938 when a group of former hacienda laborers was 
granted wooded highland. The ejidatarios reaped the 
beneﬁts of wood selling in order to acquire land, which 
they distributed equally among them not as ejido land, 
but with a private property status. Nowadays, the usual 
individual arable land acreage is 7 ha with a minimum 
of 2 ha and a maximum of 100 ha; thus, from an initial 
equal land endowment, a differentiation process has led 
to an intra-community disparity. This differentiation in 
land ownership parallels a differentiation in equipment, 
the larger landowners7 also being those better endowed 
Table 1.  Variable Production Costs and Net Expected Gains per Hectare Under Direct Cultivation (1994 
Pesos) (Exchange Rate: 0.33 US$ for one peso)
  Costs per Hectare Net Result per Hectare
  Total  Bullocks/ Manual Good ‘Expected’ Low  
Site                       Productions Cost Inputs Tractor Labor Yield/Price Yield/Price Yield/Price
Miguel Hidalgo soybean-
    safﬂower 1,500 360 (24%) 1,020 (68%) 120 (8%) 1,240 360 - 250
Felipe Angeles soybean-corn 2,170 495 (23%) 1,515 (70%) 160 (7%)  1,330 
La Soledad corn  1,340 95 (7%) 620 (46%) 625 (47%)  625
La Soledad barley  1,690 860 (51%) 670 (40%) 160 (9%)  1,065
La Soledad pea  3,460 225 (7%) 560 (16%) 2,675 (77%) 3,630  - 1,100
S. L. Quiavini milpa 1,585 30 (2%) 900 (57%) 655 (41%) - 320  - 480
Sierra Madre potato (‘colored’  
    varieties) 4,180 1,975 (47%) 980 (23%) 1,225 (29%) 4,700 1,700 - 500
La Soledad  potato (white
   varieties) 9,340 5,985 (64%) 2,125 (23%) 1,230 (13%) 15,860  5,360
Basis: monetary evaluation for all factors; the ﬁgures do not include implicit land rent and interest rates. The evaluation of the net result per 
hectare is based on a ‘normal’ situation as perceived by the actors: ‘expected’ yields correspond to the result based on what people consider as 
the usual yield in the local situation, cross-checked with sample production data; when yield or price variations are an issue in tenancy practices, 
the ﬁgures in the table correspond to good and poor prices or yields (see Colin 2003 for details). 
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in motorized equipment, some even owning combine 
harvesters. Agricultural production is based on rainfed 
cultivation, but production conditions are considered to be 
good. Techniques combine manual labor, animal labor and 
motorized labor (for plowing and barley harvesting). The 
main crops are barley (produced for the regional brewery 
industry), corn (mainly used for on-farm consumption) 
and potato (as a cash crop). The latter was introduced in 
the village in the nineties by tenants coming from other 
regions, through ﬁxed-rent and share contracts. These ten-
ants form a heterogeneous group, from very large potato 
growers owning hundreds of hectares in other regions 
(‘rancheros’), to small potato brokers and engineers 
employed in the agro-industry (‘small entrepreneurs’). 
Unlike the Sierra case, potato is not a traditional produc-
tion in this area, and Alpha and Yema varieties introduced 
in the village require better control and a more intensive 
production system, with better quality control—and, in 
return, higher income expectations (Table 1). The arrival 
of these ‘outsider-tenants’ paralleled with a change in the 
farming system created new conditions for contractual 
practices, in a context of increasing heterogeneity in the 
contractual arena. 
d)  Graciano Sánchez is located in Tamaulipas, within the 
large irrigation scheme (distrito de riego) of Las Animas. 
It is a pioneer village set up in the seventies, following 
the government expropriation of local private landown-
ers (‘rancheros’) to build the irrigation infrastructure and 
allocate land to ejidos. However, the ranchos kept large 
tracts of agricultural land within the area. The local situ-
ation is therefore marked by the coexistence of ejidos and 
ranchos. According to the agrarian policy of that time, the 
ejidos were created as collective entities and beneﬁted 
from strong public support: access to the irrigation infra-
structure, medium-term equipment credit and seasonal 
input credit and extension service. The farming system, 
based on the production of soybean in the spring-sum-
mer cycle, and corn or safﬂower (depending on the soil 
characteristics) in fall-winter, was of a Green-Revolu-
tion type: use of improved seeds, chemical fertilization, 
agrochemical treatments, and irrigation. All the work, 
with the main exception of irrigation tasks, was carried 
out with tractors. This organization broke down within a 
few years after a succession of negative results. Facing a 
structural indebtedness of the ejidos, the banks decided 
to stop funding them and seized the ejidos’ tractors. With 
the loss of credit and equipment, the ‘organizational ce-
ment’ of the collective ejido disappeared; the ejidatarios 
then considered that they were free to partition their land. 
The disappearance of the collective organization and the 
(informal) individualization of land opened the way to a 
differentiation of productive and tenancy practices, in a 
context of the ejidos’ lack of equipment and a degradation 
of agricultural production proﬁtability. The Graciano Sán-
chez situation was explored through the study of two eji-
dos, strongly differentiated in terms of soil quality: Felipe 
Angeles (fertile ﬂuvisol soils) and Miguel Hidalgo (poor 
vertisol soils). Otherwise, the ejidos were quite similar in 
terms of land endowment (10 ha per ejidatario), access to 
irrigation (all plots irrigated), and the ejidatarios’ previ-
ous activities (mostly farm workers). Following the land 
individualization, a differentiation has occurred within 
the ejidos between on the one hand, some ejidatarios who 
lease out all their land and work as wage laborers or tractor 
drivers in the ranchos, or have a micro business, and on the 
other hand, ejidatarios who have sufﬁcient skills and have 
been able to organize themselves into small groups to buy 
tractors (in Felipe Angeles), or to launch cattle breeding (in 
Miguel Hidalgo). These ejidatarios therefore directly use 
the land they own (the pastured land, in Miguel Hidalgo) 
and even lease in land from other ejidatarios. At the same 
time, the rancheros entered with a leading role in the land 
lease market as the major source of demand. In a context 
of diminishing proﬁtability of cereals and oil-seeds, the 
rancheros’ weight in this market comes from their capac-
ity, compared to the ejidatarios, to adopt the production 
of other crops requiring a strong ﬁnancing capacity as 
well as technical and marketing skills, especially onion 
for export to the United States. 
Tenancy conﬁgurations
By tenancy conﬁguration, I refer to a descriptive concept 
that renders explicit (in a static or dynamic perspective) the 
combination between: (i) the actors’ resource endowments 
(land, labor, equipment, ﬁnancing capacity, technical and 
managerial know-how, etc.), and the heterogeneity in these 
endowments in the local ‘contractual arena’; (ii) the local 
diversity in the cropping pattern and the techno-economic 
characteristics of each crop; (iii) the characteristics of the 
market environment for inputs and outputs; (iv) the charac-
terization of the relationships between the actors, sketched 
as a labor relationship, the landowner being the employer; 
a ‘land income relationship’, between a ‘passive’ landowner 
and a tenant who handles all the production process; or a 
partnership, both actors contributing to the production pro-
cess. The argument is that the relative importance of ﬁxed 
lease versus share lease as well as the functions and terms of 
share contracts might differ greatly in accordance with the 
tenancy conﬁguration.
In the Mexican context, the standard tenancy conﬁgura-
tion as depicted in the literature—large landowners leasing 
out to landless tenants as an alternative to contracting wage 
labor—corresponds quite well to the situation during the ha-
cienda era (Colin 2003). However, several factors have since 
then converged to make the land tenancy contracts far more 
complex. First and paramount is the agrarian reform, which 
produced a large redistribution of land endowment and intro-
duced more heterogeneity in the group of economic agents 
bearing rights to the land. Second, one has to consider the 
changes in the farming systems, at least in some areas, with 
the development of irrigation schemes and the introduction 
of new inputs such as mechanization, hybrid seeds, fertilizers 
and agrochemicals. These changes increased heterogeneity in 
the farming systems, with consequences for land practices. 
(i) The techno-economic characteristics of crops may tend to 
restrict the production of some crops (under direct cultivation 
or leasing in) to well-endowed farmers (creating therefore 
a type of ‘exclusion pressure’), in terms of technical and 
marketing know-how, organizational ability, equipment and 
ﬁnancial capacity through self-ﬁnancing or access to credit. 
Other cropping systems remain grounded in the land and 
labor factors and are therefore easier to carry out through 
direct cultivation, even for poorly endowed farmers. (ii) When 
agricultural production ceases to be based only on land and 
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labor, agrarian contracts may cease to be organized around the 
bi-dimensional land/labor relationship: the techno-economi-
cal change in the farming systems produces heterogeneity in 
the potential rationales for contracting. As a consequence of 
the interplay of these factors, one has to shift from simple 
land/labor tenancy models to multi-dimensional models of 
agrarian contracts, in order to deal with a broad range of 
tenancy conﬁgurations. 
In none of the sites did we ﬁnd the standard tenancy 
conﬁguration. First, with the exception of a few cases, 
producers who lease in also own land. Indeed, leasing in 
as well as leasing out is most often congruent with owner 
cultivation (except in Graciano Sánchez, where numerous 
ejidatarios lease out all their land). Second, there may be no 
difference at all in land endowments between those leasing 
in and those leasing out (as in Graciano Sánchez regarding 
leases between ejidatarios), or the differences are limited 
(San Lucas, Sierra Madre oriental) (Table 2). Third, when 
there is a difference, those leasing in are the ones who often 
are better endowed in land. Regarding manual labor, we 
recorded the presence in every site of widows or elderly 
people who did not beneﬁt from family labor, and there-
fore leased out due to a shortage of labor—but these are 
by no means large landowners. Another type of structural 
lessors found in every site, but numerous only in Graciano 
Sánchez, corresponds to landowners engaged dominantly 
in off-farm activities. 
The key factors differentiating the contractual arenas 
in the contexts studied, in terms of actors’ endowments, 
lie therefore in other dimensions than just land and labor 
endowments. Three elements appear to be largely discrimi-
nating. (i) The availability of equipment: those who lease in 
own tractors (even combine harvesters) in La Soledad and 
Graciano Sánchez, or ox teams, in San Lucas; those who 
lease out most often do not. There are two main types of 
Table 2.   Average Acreage (ha) Owned and Tenancy 
Practices
Sites Leasing in Leasing out
San Lucas Quiavini 2.3 5.0
La Soledad 17.5*  5.8 
Sierra Madre 7.4  5.7 
Graciano Sánchez 10.0* 10.0
* Excluding rancheros.
Table 3.   Importance of Land Lease and Types of Contracts (Percent Acreage)
         Contracts Regarding the Main Productions
 % Land  Fixed ‘Procampo Half  % Net
 Lease  Rent deal’ Share 1/3 or1/4 Result
San Lucas
Quiavini (milpa) 20% Milpa - - 100% - -
La Soledad 24% Barley 86% - 10% 4% -
  corn 21% - 44% 35% -
  potato 49.5% - 23% 27.5% -
Sierra Madre
(potato) 40% Potato 10% - 65% 25% -
Miguel Hidalgo
    agricultural land 81% vegetable cropping 100% - - - -
  soybean-safﬂower - - - 12% 88%
    pasture 26% pasture 100% - - - -
Felipe Angeles 47% vegetable cropping 100% - - - -
  soybean-corn 55.5% 5.5% - 33.5% 5.5%
‘Procampo deal’: following the introduction of the Procampo program in Graciano Sánchez, in 1993-94, a new arrangement developed for cereal and 
oil-seed production (crops which gave access to the subsidy), where the tenant had access to the land but left the subsidy to the landholder.
 33VOL. 64, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
exceptions however: in La Soledad, when outsider-tenants en-
gage in a medias (half-and-half) arrangements with (often the 
wealthiest) ejidatarios who are then in charge of all manual 
labor and mechanized tasks; and in the Sierra case, where 
the availability of equipment does not discriminate between 
actors leasing in and leasing out, because getting access to 
equipment is not a major stake in the contractual relationship 
(Table 1). (ii) Financing capacities: landowners leasing out 
ﬁnd themselves under a ﬁnancing rather than a labor con-
straint, which prevents them from paying mechanized services 
when they do not own the equipment, in the farming systems 
in which mechanized equipment play a crucial role (Graciano 
Sánchez, La Soledad, San Lucas), or to buy inputs (potato 
production in the Sierra Madre). An exception corresponds to 
the case of wealthy ejidatarios from La Soledad who lease out 
under share contracts in order to get access to potato seeds, to 
tenants’ technical expertise and to an insertion in marketing 
networks (cf. infra). It is therefore not a surprise if the tenants 
are often in a better ﬁnancial position than their landlords—it 
is indeed a condition for matching the landlords’s needs. But 
tenants can ﬁnd themselves under ﬁnancing constraints as 
well, as the analysis of contractual choices will show. (iii) 
Technical, marketing and organizational skills: the incidence 
on tenancy practices of asymmetric distribution of these skill 
endowments logically arises in the case where such skills play 
a determining role: in Graciano Sánchez among ejidatarios 
(‘technicalized’ cereal and oleaginous production, intensive 
cattle breeding), and between ejidatarios and rancheros (on-
ion); in La Soledad among ejidatarios (barley production), 
and between ejidatarios and rancheros (potato).
What appears is the heterogeneity among landown-
ers and much more among tenants, and the many different 
types of couples of actors in the contractual arena. This cre-
ates three speciﬁc broad tenancy conﬁgurations. (i) In the 
‘rentier/entrepreneur’ conﬁguration, technical and marketing 
skills, equipment and ﬁnancing capacity play a central role 
in the production process; the ‘exclusion pressure’ regarding 
direct cultivation is therefore high. Because of a differenti-
ated distribution in production factors other than land, and 
of credit market imperfection, well-endowed actors lease in 
from constrained landowners, in a type of reverse tenancy 
situation. ‘Reverse tenancy’ usually designates a situation 
where large landowners lease in from small landowners. 
Here, such a situation is not excluded, but the focus is rather 
on differentiation regarding other factors than land. Graciano 
Sánchez offers a good illustration of such a tenancy conﬁgu-
ration, when rancheros or groups of ejidatarios lease in land 
from ‘passive’ ejidatarios. (ii) In the ‘business partnership’ 
conﬁgurations, both the tenant and the landowner are produc-
ers who face constraints and pool complementary resources. 
These conﬁgurations are rooted in complementary factor 
endowments, and in production processes in which factors 
other than (undifferentiated) land and (unskilled) labor play 
a central role. In the ‘co-management business partnership 
conﬁguration’, production is organized in a close interaction 
between the two partners working in a day-to-day interaction; 
this is quite well illustrated by the a medias contract for potato 
production in the Sierra Madre Oriental. In the ‘delegation 
business partnership conﬁguration,’ some tasks are delegated 
from one actor to the other without a day-to-day interaction. 
This conﬁguration can be illustrated with the a medias con-
tract for potato production between outsiders-tenants and 
ejidatarios-landowners in La Soledad. (iii) The ‘subsistence’ 
conﬁguration, with San Lucas as a typical case, is character-
ized by a low proﬁtability of agricultural production and a 
self-provisioning strategy, which translate into production 
for on-farm consumption and no structural market-oriented 
surplus production. There is therefore no incentive for increas-
ing the acreage cultivated beyond self-sufﬁciency, especially 
through land leasing. As the production process is mainly 
based on ox team labor, the tenancy relationship is grounded 
in the land/ox team adjustment. 
In the light of such an heterogeneity in tenancy conﬁgura-
tions, one expects that there would be multiple rationales for 
sharecropping. Taking into account the diversity in the terms 
of share contracts leads to the same view.
Sharecropping as a Polymorphic
Institutional Arrangement
Disaggregated data show the variable importance of 
tenancy in the same location, for different crops (Table 3).8 
With the exception of San Lucas, different contractual ar-
rangements are used in the same site. 
Beyond generic denominations (a medias, al tercio—one 
third), sharecropping arrangements show a high polymorphism 
(sometimes in the same place and for the same crop) not only 
in the way the product is shared, but also in the way the tenant 
and the landholder contribute to the production (Table 4). 
Two broad types of share contracts can be distinguished. 
In some of these contracts, the tenant handles all the produc-
tion process and bears all the costs up to the harvest; the only 
contribution of the landowner apart from land is his contribu-
tion to the cost of harvesting and transportation, in the same 
proportion as his share of the product: al tercio (one third) 
contract in Graciano Sánchez, in La Soledad (corn), in the 
Sierra Madre oriental (potato), al cuarto (one fourth) in the 
Sierra Madre (potato). More exceptionally, the sharing can 
intervene after the deduction of all production costs, such as 
with the ‘Percentage of the net result’ contract in Graciano 
Sánchez. In all these cases, the share contract bears the nature 
of a ‘land income arrangement’, where the landowner’s share 
of the product corresponds to the counterpart of the tenant’s 
access to land. In other sharecropping arrangements, the 
landowner contributes in some way to the production process, 
before the harvest; the arrangement leans then more towards 
a partnership. These are mostly a medias (one half) contracts: 
in San Lucas (milpa production), in La Soledad (corn, pea, 
potato), in the Sierra Madre (potato); the al tercio contract for 
potato production in La Soledad corresponds also to this type 
of sharecropping arrangement, with the landowner participat-
ing in the production. The diversity in sharecropping contract 
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Table 4.   Share Contracts Terms
   Contribution:  Product
 Contract Landowner Tenant Cost-Sharing Share 
Graciano Sánchez
  (corn, safﬂower) ‘% net result’1 land in charge of all all production 1/4 landlord
   production process; costs 3/4 tenant
   pre-ﬁnances all costs
Graciano Sánchez
   (soy, corn, safﬂower) ‘% harvest’2 land in charge of all production harvesting and 1/4 landlord
   process; bears all costs  transportation 3/4 tenant
   up to the harvest (shared 1/4 - 3/4)
Sierra Madre (potato) al cuarto land in charge of all production  harvesting and 1/4 landlord 
   process; bears all costs   transportation 3/4 tenant 
   up to the harvest   (shared 1/4 - 3/4) 
La Soledad (corn) al tercio land in charge of all production harvesting and 1/3 landlord
 process; bears all costs  transportation   2/3 tenant 
   up to the harvest  (shared 1/3 - 2/3) 
Sierra Madre (potato) al tercio land in charge of all production harvesting and 1/3 landlord
   process; bears all costs  transportation 2/3 tenant
   up to the harvest  (shared 1/3 - 2/3)
La Soledad (potato) al tercio land + labor + potato seeds +  harvesting and 1/3 landlord
  all mechanized fertilizer +  transportation 2/3 tenant
  work agrochemicals (shared 1/3 - 2/3) 
San Lucas Quiavini
   (milpa) a medias land + seeds all manual and animal harvesting and 1/2
   labor up to the harvest transportation;
    if used, tractor
    and fertilizer costs 
La Soledad
   (pea, corn, barley) a medias land + plowing seeds, fertilizer, harvesting and   1/2
   agrochemicals, labor transportation
   up to the harvest  
La Soledad
   (potato, usual case3) a medias land + labor + seeds harvesting and  1/2
  mechanized  transportation; 
  work  fertilizer and
    agrochemical
    costs 
Sierra Madre
   (potato, usual case3) a medias land + plowing3 seeds + fertilizer  harvesting and  1/2
  + manual and (or manual and  transportation; 
  animal labor animal labor) agrochemical
  (or fertilizer)  costs
1 ‘Porcentaje de la utilidad’
2 ‘Porcentaje de la cosecha’
3 The precise terms of a medias contracts for potato production are much more diverse (20 different conﬁgurations recorded in the Sierra).
terms shows the need to ground the analysis of contractual 
practices on more precise categories than just the generic 
concept of sharecropping, by distinguishing not only the 
way the product is shared, but also the ways in which the 
two actors contribute to the arrangement. It also shows 
the need to go beyond the generic local terminology, all 
the more since a single denomination can cover different 
contractual terms.
 35VOL. 64, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
Regarding the way costs and products are shared in the 
sharecropping arrangements, the general rule distinguishes 
cases where the landowner does not contribute to the produc-
tion up to the harvest and receives one third or one fourth 
of the product, and the cases where he participates in the 
production and receives one half of the product. This general 
principle needs however to be adjusted in order to integrate 
land scarcity (implicit valorization of land), the importance 
and structure of production costs, as well as the weight of 
harvest and transportation costs in the total cost. The very 
explicit logic underlying a medias arrangements is a search 
for equilibrium in the contribution of the partners (“Hay que 
salir parejos”, “we have to make a fair deal”). Table 5 shows 
that the contribution of the landowner to production costs up 
to the harvest (excluding land valorization) is quite variable, 
from 0 (al tercio in Graciano Sánchez) to 40 percent (a medias 
contract for potato production in the Sierra), but that a global 
adjustment is revealed between the actors’ cost and product 
shares once land valorization and the landowner’s contribution 
to harvest costs are taken into consideration. In the one third and 
one fourth contracts, landowner contribution can be estimated 
between 20 and 30 percent of the cost; in a medias contracts, 
this contribution varies around 45 to 60 percent. 
Sharecropping as a Polyfunctional 
Institutional Arrangement
From the point of view of actors leasing out, two main 
cases can be distinguished. Some landowners are not in a logic 
of agricultural production, they develop off-farm activities 
and lease out all their land, favoring cash leases; this type of 
landowners has been encountered as a non-marginal group 
only in Graciano Sánchez. In the dominant case, landowners 
are in a productive logic; they use their land under owner 
cultivation as far as their available resources allow them. They 
lease out the remaining area, usually looking for a sharecrop-
ping arrangement. The type of sharecropping arrangement 
sought (as long as local diversity exists in the types of share-
cropping contracts) is then a function of remaining resources 
that could contribute to the production process: from a medias 
to al tercio/cuarto contracts, i.e., from an involvement in the 
production and a better share of the product, to a participation 
limited to the harvest, but with a lesser share of the product. 
They favor ﬁxed leases only if they have urgent cash needs, 
or if they plan to invest that cash inﬂow in production costs 
for another plot under direct cultivation. 
From the tenants’ point of view, three main perspectives 
can be distinguished. (i) Any contract other than a ﬁxed lease 
is ruled out in the case of intensive vegetable cropping by 
rancheros (onion in Graciano Sánchez, potato in La Soledad). 
Three rationales intervene here: (a) with a ﬁxed lease, the 
tenant gets the full return on his expertise and investments; 
(b) a share arrangement would require the capacity of the 
landowner to contribute in some extent to the production 
process, and there is little that smallholder lessors offer. (ii) 
In the case of ejidatarios, groups of ejidatarios or small en-
trepreneurs running “technicalized” farming systems (cereal 
and oleaginous in Graciano Sánchez, barley in La Soledad), 
or medium-intensity colored potato production in the Sierra, 
the preference also goes indisputably to ﬁxed lease (except 
under some conditions which will be further developed), 
but share contracts may be looked for due to cash or other 
constraints. The type of sharecropping arrangement then 
sought is, here again, a function of the available resources, 
but with the expected inversion when compared to (‘active’) 
landowners’ preferences: from al tercio or al cuarto contracts 
if they can carry out the production without a contribution 
by the landowner, to a medias in the opposite case. (iii) In 
the case of tenants in marginal ecological conditions such as 
San Lucas, ﬁxed leases are excluded.
Table 5. Landowner’s Contribution to Costs
 Production Costs Production Cost  Total Cost Including 
 Up to the Harvest  Including Harvest Land Valorization Product Share
Sierra Madre, potato  0% 10% 19% 1/4 or 1/3
Felipe Angeles soybean/corn 0% 8% 22% 1/4 or 1/3
La Soledad, potato 18% 22% 30% 1/4 or 1/3
La Soledad, potato 28% 40% 46% 1/2
Sierra Madre, potato 40% 43% 48% 1/2
San Lucas Quiavini, milpa 5% 30% 51% 1/2
La Soledad, barley 24% 29% 53% 1/2
La Soledad, pea 28% 47% 56% 1/2
La Soledad, corn 32% 39% 60% 1/2
The case of the ‘Percentage of the net result’ contract in Graciano Sánchez was excluded here, as this type of contract remains marginal. In San 
Lucas Quiavini, the implicit land rent is based on the only ﬁxed lease we knew of at the time of the ﬁeldwork.
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Through the different case studies, sharecropping thus 
appears as a device aiming at offsetting ﬁnancing constraints 
(i.e., access to credit), or managing risk, or offsetting (other 
than credit) market imperfections. The function of sharecrop-
ping as an incentive device also appears, but not as crucially 
as predicted by most theoretical models. 
a)  Offsetting ﬁnancing constraints9. Sharecropping arrange-
ments may offset ﬁnancial constraints ﬁrst, because the 
rent is paid ex post (after the harvest), i.e., on credit. 
Sharecropping is then an alternative to a ﬁxed lease, with 
the typical case of al tercio contract in Graciano Sánchez 
for soybean-corn production. Al tercio and al cuarto 
contracts for potato production in the Sierra Madre come 
under a similar rationale when they result from a tenant 
cash constraint, which excludes a ﬁxed rent10. In all these 
cases, the tenants would have preferred to lease under a 
ﬁxed rent, but ﬁnancial constraints impeded paying ex 
ante (i.e., before the sowing) a cash rent. As a matter of 
fact, these tenants do actually rent under ﬁxed leases when 
they can, as shown by an examination of past and present 
individual contractual practices. Second, when both ac-
tors contribute to the production process, sharecropping 
permits factor complementarity and therefore saves on 
cash expenses—each actor brings his own factors (i.e., not 
bought on the market) in exchange for his partner’s fac-
tors and therefore does not have to buy them. The typical 
case here is the a medias contract in the Sierra Madre, as 
a mean to ﬂexibly manage factors according to their avail-
ability. In the most common arrangement, the landowner 
provides the land, the tenant provides the seeds (a part of 
the production from the previous agricultural campaign, 
kept for this purpose) and the ﬁnancial resources of both 
actors are pooled to buy fertilizers and agro-chemicals. 
With such an arrangement, the tenant avoids the pay-
ment of the land rent and the landowner economizes the 
purchase of the seeds. 
  The ﬁnancial constraint can be rooted in the lack of a 
credit system (other than usury credit)—a negative rela-
tionship between access to credit and the acreage under 
sharecropping has indeed been perceived in all sites. 
The ﬁnancial constraint can also be rooted in the actor’s 
rejection of an indebtedness that could lead to the loss of 
the assets used as collateral (an attitude also found in the 
different sites). It can lastly come from the impossibil-
ity of ﬁnancing the production with a credit, when this 
production is highly uncertain and just not proﬁtable in a 
market perspective (San Lucas). 
b)  Managing uncertainty. Economic theory envisioning 
sharecropping as a pure risk management device (an ap-
proach that is no longer favored in the literature) focused 
on the risk sharing effect of a rent proportional to the 
production. One does ﬁnd elements among these case 
studies to sustain this interpretation. The a medias arrange-
ment in San Lucas provides the best illustration where 
this function centrally determines tenancy practices, in a 
marginal agro-ecological environment. In the case of pea 
production in La Soledad (lottery-type of cultivation, due 
to highly volatile market prices), tenants look for a medias 
contracts not only to avoid risking a cash lease (what an al 
tercio contract would allow), but also to reduce the costs 
engaged in production (economizing the land prepara-
tion). A striking risk-coverage device is the “Percentage 
of the net result” contract in the ejido Miguel Hidalgo, in 
Graciano Sánchez: there, because of soil conditions, cereal 
and oleaginous production in the rainy season (but not 
vegetable cropping during the dry season) is quite risky 
and of low economic interest (Table 1). Tenants other than 
rancheros producing vegetable crops accept to lease in a 
plot only if they protect themselves against such a risk, 
not only with a proportional rent, but also by sharing the 
net result, after the deduction of all production costs. 
   The way risk intervenes in contractual practices also 
depends on the type of investment considered. Often, 
the actors show a dual attitude towards risk, with an 
aversion regarding the risk of losing cash investments 
(out-of-the-pocket expenses) paralleled with a risk neu-
tral/taking attitude regarding investing owned factors in 
the production process. In the Sierra Madre Oriental, some 
potato producers—especially among the smallest—tried 
to reduce the risk on cash expenses by ﬁnding tenants who 
would provide all or most of the inputs that have to be 
bought on the market, themselves providing owned fac-
tors. In San Lucas, cash cost minimization is a “structural” 
behavioral feature. Financing constraints and risk aver-
sion regarding cash investments have the same effects on 
tenancy practices, through a cash-expenses minimization 
strategy. However, access to credit would eliminate the 
ﬁnancing constraint but would not necessarily change ac-
tors’ attitude toward cash investment—this attitude being 
much more linked to general wealth considerations. The 
fact that the risk of losing a cash expense is much more 
taken into account than the risk of losing the investment 
of owned factors (such as domestic labor, or work real-
ized with one’s own equipment, or seeds coming from a 
previous harvest) concretely signiﬁes that opportunity 
costs and out-of-the-pocket costs are implicitly managed 
on different decision-making registers. This perception 
of monetary costs, more or less noticeable depending on 
the situations, has therefore a direct implication on con-
tractual choices. These choices are not just determined by 
the available resources, they are also determined by the 
form of these resources (cash funds versus owned fac-
tors), the strategy of monetary cost minimization guiding 
contractual choices in a number of cases. 
c)  Offsetting ‘market imperfections’. Beyond resolving 
ﬁnancing constraints induced by the lack of credit, a 
sharecropping arrangement can, in the perspective of 
both the lessor and the lessee, help overcome constraints 
regarding access to factors—market imperfections, in 
economists’ terms. (i) Access to ox team services: in 
San Lucas, someone lacking oxen runs the high risk of 
not ﬁnding at the appropriate time someone to lease the 
ox team services. The solution is to lease out land to a 
sharecropper who owns an ox team. (ii) Market for—or 
public provision of—extension services: sharecropping 
can be a learning device, by meeting the need for techni-
cal capacity building, when there is no extension support. 
This is illustrated with La Soledad ejidatarios willing to 
adopt potato cropping: leasing out land to a potato grower 
under a share arrangement is a way to gain access to the 
tenant’s expertise. (iii) Seed market: the producers from La 
Soledad who wish to adopt potato cultivation face the lack 
of a local market for seeds; the potato producers from the 
Sierra also face this constraint when they want to introduce 
new varieties. Leasing out to a sharecropper who brings 
the seeds solves the problem. (iv) Forage market: in San 
Lucas, some ox team owners explain that they sharecrop in 
less for corn production than for zacate production, used as 
forage, due to the risk of not ﬁnding zacate on the market 
at a certain time of the year. (v) Product market: one of 
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the advantages found by the ejidatarios of La Soledad in 
leasing out land under a sharecropping arrangement is, 
as neophyte potato growers, to beneﬁt from the tenants’ 
insertion in the marketing network. (vi) Insurance market: 
the fact that sharecropping contracts have a risk manage-
ment function for some actors is evidently related to the 
absence of an insurance market. 
d)  The incentive/monitoring issue. The incentive/monitoring 
issue regarding the tenant work effort is the key compo-
nent of most economic theories of sharecropping. This 
factor indeed has an impact on contractual practices, but 
not as overwhelming an impact as would be expected. In 
San Lucas, the monitoring issue was particularly raised 
by landowners who were women, elderly people or were 
mainly involved in off-farm activities, i.e., who were in 
the worst condition to effectively monitor wage labor. In 
La Soledad, when an “outsider-tenant”—i.e., a non-resi-
dent tenant—leases in land to produce potato, he can do 
so under a ﬁxed-lease arrangement and install an ‘agent’ 
(an employee) in the village, to take care of day-to-day 
crop management, to contract and monitor wage labor and 
to contract mechanized services if he does not bring in 
his own equipment. Indeed, that is what the large entre-
preneurs do. Regarding small entrepreneur-tenants, such 
a solution would require ﬁnancial and human resources 
they lack; leasing in with a share arrangement, with the 
local-resident landowner taking care of all these tasks, is 
thus their only solution. One can interpret it in an agency 
perspective: in order to give incentives to the agent so 
that he will manage the production as best as he can, he 
has to be turned into a residual claimant through a share 
contract; but at the same time, this solution saves on non-
agency types of transaction costs (e.g., for a non-resident 
producer, contracting mechanized services) and on mon-
etary costs (no cash rent, production costs sharing). More 
hypothetically—this would be the strongest impact of the 
risk of opportunistic behavior on contractual practices in 
the contexts we studied—the risk of moral hazard might 
rule out the emergence of a contractual arrangement 
in which a ﬁxed rent could be paid ex post and would 
explain the frequent use of sharecropping with one third 
or one fourth shares as an alternative to ﬁxed rents, for 
cash-constrained tenants. Three hypotheses can explain 
the non-emergence of such an arrangement: (i) the risk 
induced by the ex post ﬁxed payment: the tenant might 
not be able to pay the rent after a poor campaign (Shetty 
1988), or could try to delay or reduce the payment; (ii) 
landholders’ preference/need for immediate cash; (iii) the 
difﬁculty to conceive and make acceptable a radically new 
institutional arrangement. Empirical data do not favor any 
of these hypotheses. What matters here is the fact that in 
the actors’ perspective, a ﬁxed-rent arrangement with an 
ex post payment just does not belong to their ‘frame of 
reference’, to the range of possible coordination devices 
that they envision. 
To sum up, designing the contract in such a way to re-
duce the risk of moral hazard is not the major determinant 
of contractual practices in the cases studied. This issue 
intervenes rather through the systematic participation (or at 
least control) of both actors in harvesting and marketing in all 
share contracts, and also regarding the choice of the partner, 
through an ex ante screening process (you do not to enter in 
a contractual relationship with someone you do not trust). 
Consequently, monitoring and enforcement were not seen 
by the farmers as a problematic issue and very few conﬂicts 
were reported11. 
Conclusion
The ﬁndings presented in this paper illustrate the di-
versity of tenancy practices within the same country, within 
communities and sometimes for the same crop: a diversity 
regarding the way the production and the production costs 
are shared, regarding the types of production concerned, 
and regarding the types of actors involved. They allow us to 
discuss the grand economic theories of share contracts from 
a comprehensive empirical perspective. 
The ‘standard’ agency approach of sharecropping con-
ceptualizes this institutional arrangement as an implicit labor 
relationship whose rationale comes from a trade-off between 
the tenant’s incentive and his risk aversion. This model 
clearly does not correspond to the cases where the contract 
constitutes, in the tenants’ perspective, a device aiming to 
pay the land rent on credit, without any participation by the 
landowners to the production process (al tercio and al cuarto 
contracts). The choice of this type of contract does not come 
then from the tenants’ risk aversion, but from the ﬁnancing 
constraint they face regarding the ex ante payment of a ﬁxed 
rent. Moreover, the postulate of a landowner-principal able to 
deﬁne the contractual arrangement under the sole constraint 
of ensuring the tenant-agent an income equivalent to the one 
he would gain on the labor market does not correspond to 
the actors’ relationships in these situations where the tenant 
is in a better economic situation than the landowner or even 
in reverse tenancy situations (rentier/entrepreneur conﬁgura-
tion). In the case of partnership conﬁgurations, the key role 
attributed to the tenant’s risk aversion to explain contractual 
choices in the standard principal-agent model is also refuted: 
the a medias contracts fundamentally ﬁnd their rationale in 
ﬁnancing constraints and market imperfections—or (to state 
it in another way to avoid to suggest that the sole “natural” 
coordination device is the market) in constraints regarding 
access to land, labor, inputs, equipments, knowledge or expe-
rience. Moreover, the actors perceive these resource-pooling 
arrangements as grounded in the convergence of interde-
pendent interests, as a fair and equitable relationship with a 
sharing in half of the product and a search for an equilibrium 
in the partners’ contributions.
Transaction cost models of sharecropping tend not to 
emphasize risk and conceptualize contractual choice as guided 
by a trade-off between different transaction costs induced by 
actors’ opportunism. These Mexican cases give support to the 
idea of a non-systematic structuring role of risk in contractual 
choices. However, the previous analysis showed the limited 
weight of the monitoring/enforcement issue in contractual 
choices. Transaction costs do intervene in some cases, but 
they are not necessarily induced by opportunistic behavior 
(such as access to an ox team for rent in San Lucas, to seeds 
for Alpha potato in La Soledad or to forage in San Lucas and 
Miguel Hidalgo).
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Sharecropping appears rather as a ‘polyfunctional’ 
institutional arrangement, with a large palette of possible 
raison d’être, depending on the actors’ goals: offsetting ﬁ-
nancing constraints (i.e., imperfect credit market and wealth 
constraints) by reducing cash costs (rent on credit, pooling 
of owned factors in exchange of inputs that would otherwise 
have to be purchased) and by pooling available cash (indus-
trial input cost-sharing); but also offsetting seed, ox team 
rental or product markets imperfections; offsetting search 
and monitoring costs regarding contracting wage labor or 
leasing equipments, when one of the actors does not reside 
locally or cannot carry out these tasks; spreading production 
or market risks; acting as a learning device; or, at last, acting 
as an incentive device. 
Depending on the tenancy conﬁguration, the type of 
contract and the rationale for sharecropping can differ widely. 
From a theoretical point of view any monist explanation of 
contractual practices is rejected; the search for the model of 
sharecropping is therefore a Grail quest lost in advance. We 
only need to survey the literature to realize the non-trivial 
character of this simple result. Unless one locates contractual 
practices within a broad conception of the tenancy conﬁgu-
ration, the explanation of the contractual arrangements will 
always rely on implicit contextual speciﬁcity, which in itself 
is not problematic. What is much more questionable is for 
these theories to lead to universalist explanations and/or to 
intend to orient public policy decision-making. 
Notes
1Due to the lack of space, the paper will not deal with the ‘conven-
tion’ dimension of the contractual arrangements, which challenges their 
conceptualization as pure contractual arrangements, and enlightens their 
cognitive role (Colin 2002). As the investigation concentrated on con-
tractual choice, it did not deal with two interesting issues: the outcome 
of contractual practices in terms of socio-economic differentiation and 
stratiﬁcation, and gender issues. Whereas there is an increasing literature 
on women’s land rights (Agarwal 1994; Deere and León 2003), contrac-
tual analysis has not yet integrated gender issues. Taking into account 
these dimensions would question the unitary approach of the household 
underlying the economic analysis of agrarian contract.
2Even if one ﬁnds abundant literature mentioning sharecropping in 
the haciendas, from the 18th to the beginning of the 20th centuries, and 
numerous mentions to contractual practices in the context of ejidos 
or ranchos (see references in Colin 2003), very few studies focused 
on sharecropping in contemporary Mexico (Finkler 1978, McFarland 
Correa 1991).
3With a sample size of 72 in Graciano Sánchez, 39 in La Soledad, 
55 in San Lucas and 239 in the Sierra Madre Oriental. Research was 
conducted in close collaboration with Emmanuelle Bouquet in La Sole-
dad, and Christophe Blanchot, Enrique Vásquez and Hermilio Navarro 
in Graciano Sánchez. 
4For simplicity, the ethnographic present refers to the time of the 
ﬁeldwork in each site.
5Land redistribution through the Agrarian reform was undertaken under 
the ejido institution. The ejido is usually composed of individually-managed 
parcels and a collective area devoted to grazing and wood collection; the 
ejido could also be collective, without any individual parceling. Up to 
1992, ejido land could not legally be mortgaged, sold, or leased under 
any tenancy contract (with some exceptions, regarding widows or 
disabled people). In 1992, a land legislation reform authorized sales 
(with restrictions) and tenancy contracts (without restrictions) on 
ejido land.
6The communal status (tierras comunales, belonging to comuni-
dades agrarias) corresponds to indigenous communities which were 
able to maintain their land rights during the land privatization policy 
at the end of the 19th century and whose claims to land were later rec-
ognized through the comunidad agraria by the Agrarian reform. The 
communal land is often de facto operated as though it were a private 
property system, including exclusion right and the possibility to sale a 
plot, as in San Lucas (the land market being however restricted to the 
community’s members).
7I use the term of landowner for simplicity, even if the ejidatario’s 
right on land does not correspond to a full private property right.
 
8Although dealing with the crucial question of the relationships be-
tween the legal framework and local land practices is beyond the scope of 
this paper, one should note that regarding the sites we studied, the 1992 
legal reform only led to the legalization of contractual practices which 
were already ﬂourishing locally (see Colin 2003 for an analysis). 
9The role of ﬁnancing constraints on contractual practices has 
remained marginal in recent economic literature (see Laffont and 
Matoussi 1995).
10Such a rationale is not at work, of course, when tenants look for 
a ﬁxed rent but accept landowners’ proposal of a share contract, e.g., 
because of the good quality of the plot. 
11Except in La Soledad regarding ‘outsider’-tenants (see Bouquet 
and Colin 2003 for an analysis).
References
Agarwal, Bina
 1994 A ﬁeld of one’s own. Gender and land rights in South Asia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bardhan, Pranab, ed.
 1989 The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Bouquet, Emmanuelle, and Jean-Philippe Colin
 2003 Dynamiques contractuelles, aléa moral et processus 
d’apprentissage (La Soledad, Tlaxcala). In Figures du métayage. 
Etude comparée de contrats agraires au Mexique. Jean-Philippe 
Colin, ed. Pp. 195-238. Paris: Editions de l’IRD. 
Colin, Jean-Philippe, ed. 
 2003 Figures du métayage. Etude comparée de contrats agraires 
au Mexique. Paris: Editions de l’IRD.
Colin, Jean-Philippe
 2002 Contrats agraires ou conventions agraires ? Economie rurale 
272:57-73.
Dasgupta, Siddhartha, Thomas Knight, and Alan Love
 1999 Evolution of Agricultural Land Leasing Models: A Survey 
of the Literature. Review of Agricultural Economics 21 
(1):148-176.
 39VOL. 64, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
Deere, Carmen, Diana, and Magdalena León
 2003 The Gender Asset Gap: Land in Latin America. World 
Development 31(6):925-47.
de Janvry, Alain, Gustavo Gordillo, Jean-Philippe Platteau, and Elisabeth 
Sadoulet, eds.
 2001 Access to land, Rural Poverty, and Public Action. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Deininger, Klaus, and Gershon Feder
 2001 Land Institutions and Land Markets. In Handbook of 
Agricultural Economics, vol. 1A. B. Bruce Gardner and Gordon 
Rausser, eds. Pp. 288-331. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Finkler, Kaja
 1978 From Sharecroppers to Entrepreneurs: Peasant Household 
Production Strategies under the Ejido System of Mexico. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 27:103-120.
Hayami, Yujiro, and Keijiro Otsuka
 1993 The Economics of Contract Choice. An Agrarian Perspective. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Mohamed Matoussi
 1995 Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in 
El Oulja. Review of Economic Studies 62:381-399.
Linderberg, Siegwart
 1998 The Cognitive Turn in Institutional Aanalysis: Beyond NIE 
and NIS? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
154:716-727. 
McFarland Correa, Phyllis
 1991 Changing Patterns of Sharecropping Arrangements in 
the Municipio of Allende, State of Guanajuato, Mexico. PhD 
dissertation, State University of New York.
North, Douglass
 1990 Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Otsuka, Keijiro, Hiroyuki Chuma, and Yujiro Hayami
 1992 Land and Labor Contracts in Agrarian Economies: Theories 
and Facts. Journal of Economic Literature 30:1965-2018.
Shetty, Sudhir
 1988 Limited Liability, Wealth Differences and Tenancy Contracts 
in Agrarian Economies. Journal of Development Economics 
29:1-22.
Stiglitz, Joseph
 1974 Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping. Review of 
Economic Studies 41(2):219-255.
World Bank
 2003 Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. A World 
Bank Policy Research Report. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
